This briefing paper provides an overview of the existing European Union approach to issues of security, counter-terrorism, and organised crime. In particular, it focuses on the role of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in the formation of policy and in the development of new institutions and institutional arrangements within the EU, and the influence of the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This briefing paper provides an overview of the existing European Union approach to issues of security, counter-terrorism, and organised crime. In particular, it focuses on the role of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in the formation of policy and the development of new institutions and institutional arrangements within the EU, and the influence of the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA).
Based on the evidence presented in this paper, it appears clear that the ESS has played a major role in improving awareness of the need for greater coordination between EU and national agencies as regards the promotion of security, counter-terrorism activity, and the investigation and prosecution of organised crime. Given that the EU has no formal powers to mandate how individual Member States address these issues, the ESS has proved to be an effective mechanism for promoting collaborative efforts between Member States and the EU, and has led to the strengthening of a number of existing EU institutions, including Europol. Likewise, the OCTA has led to increased awareness of the problem of organised crime in the EU, and has helped to foster information sharing and police cooperation across Member States.
Despite these successes, the EU approach to security, counter-terrorism and organised crime remains fragmented and characterised by high levels of bureaucracy, inefficiency, and institutional inertia. In part, this stems from the fact that no single agency or individual currently has responsibility for these matters. Although the introduction of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator has led to some improvements in this area, he has struggled to provide the sort of overarching management and strategic planning required by the ESS. Furthermore, the reluctance of individual Member States to grant additional powers or commit additional resources to agencies like Europol has meant that the EU has been limited in its ability to provide the sort of central support and guidance that is clearly needed.
In light of these and other concerns, this briefing paper recommends that steps be taken to streamline and rationalise the existing structures concerned with security, counter-terrorism and organised crime. Given the number of agencies either directly or indirectly involved in the gathering of information, the production of intelligence,
Introduction
In the aftermath of the events of September 11 th in the United States and subsequent terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, there has been growing recognition within the European Union of the need for Member States to work more closely on matters of security and policing. In addition, in recent years organised crime has come to be regarded by many as a key threat to the internal security of the EU, and a problem that requires a coordinated and concerted response from Member States.
This briefing paper provides an overview of institutional arrangements and policies that have been developed within the European Union to respond to the dual threats of terrorism and organised crime. In particular, this paper focuses on the relationships between the various agencies responsible for monitoring and generating intelligence on terrorism and organised crime, and suggests a number of ways in which existing intelligence sharing and operational practices might be improved.
For the sake of clarity and accessibility, this briefing paper is divided into three main sections. Section One considers the development and major aims of the European Security Strategy, and provides an overview of the key institutions and arrangements involved in its implementation. Section Two then examines the role played by
Europol and other EU agencies in the fight against organised crime and the development of the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA). In addition, this section considers the role played by a range of other EU and national institutions in the promotion of security and the policing of organised crime. Finally, Section Three concludes the report by identifying some of the key challenges facing the existing security and policing framework.
Section One: Security and Counter-Terrorism in the EU
The European Security Strategy (ESS)
At the heart of the European Union's approach to questions of security and the threat of terrorism is the European Security Strategy (ESS). 1 Drafted by the EU's High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Janvier Solana, the policy was adopted by the Brussels European Council in December 2003. The product of the collective thinking and shared experiences of the Member States, the strategy establishes a common approach to questions of security and sets out three clear objectives:
(1) to identify global challenges and key threats to the security of the EU;
(2) to build security in the EU neighbourhood; and (3) to promote an international order based on effective multilateralism as regards matters of security.
In the five years since it was first adopted, the ESS has come to be regarded as a 
Successes and Challenges
The introduction of the ESS has undoubtedly raised awareness at all levels within the EU of the need for a more coordinated and efficient approach to matters of security, counter-terrorism, and organised crime. Although it does not provide a detailed "road- There is, however, an inherent tension at the centre of this aspirational (as opposed to prescriptive) approach to EU security, terrorism, and organised crime. Although there is clearly a collective interest in improving EU security and fostering greater cooperation between Member States when it comes to matters of terrorism and organised crime, ultimately security and law enforcement are pursued at a national level. As a consequence, while the ESS has enjoyed broad support, Member States have nonetheless maintained control over nearly all aspects of their operational responses to security and criminal threats within the EU. Furthermore, Member States have thus far been largely unwilling to grant greater powers of investigation or prosecution to agencies like Europol or to increase the level of resources they currently provide in support of EU-level security and anti-terrorism activities. Instead, they have tended to act bilaterally when it comes to cross-border investigations, sharing information and intelligence on an ad hoc basis or in accordance with longstanding bilateral agreements.
This fact was recently acknowledged by the Council in a report on the implementation of the ESS. 10 While noting that the EU has made substantial progress in the area of security and organised crime in the last five years, the report concedes that there is still much to be done and that the ESS remains a work in progress. More specifically, the report openly states that there are still substantial improvements to be made in terms of coordination, both between the agencies of the EU and between the EU and Member States:
We need to improve the way in which we bring together internal and external dimensions. Better co-ordination, transparency and flexibility are needed across different agencies, at national and European level. This was already identified in the ESS, five years ago. Progress has been slow and incomplete.
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In part, the problem of coordination stems from the fact that a wide range of institutions and agencies are involved in the development of security and antiterrorism policy at the EU level. 12 Although the introduction of a Counter-Terrorism
Coordinator was a positive step, the Coordinator's task has been made especially 10 EC (2008) ESS Report (fn 4 above).
11 Ibid, p. 4.
12 For a detailed analysis of this problem, see Keohane, Daniel (2005) , "The EU and Counter-terrorism", Centre for European Reform Report, pp. 17-22.
difficult by the sheer number of bodies he is required to deal with. In addition to
Europol and Eurojust, the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator is also responsible for harmonising the activities of the terrorism working group (composed of national interior ministry officials), the foreign policy 'working group on terrorism' (composed of national foreign ministry officials), and the Police Chiefs' Task Force.
As has been argued by the Centre for European Reform, however, this situation is far from desirable and could have been avoided had Europol been given clear leadership on matters of security and counter-terrorism within the EU. Parliaments. 14 Until these proposals are implemented and the detailed regulations governing the scrutiny of Europol are introduced, the institution is unlikely to be able to make any substantial progress in terms of expanding its coordinating role. 13 As noted in 2005 report of the Centre for European Reform, however, Europol has not been able to assume this role due to the reluctance of national police forces and intelligence agencies to share information with Europol. Keohane, ibid, p. 20. 14 According to the text of Article 88 (originally Article III-276 of the Constitution Treaty):
1. Europol's mission shall be to support and strengthen action by the Member States' police authorities and other law enforcement services and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy.
2. The European Parliament and the Council, by means of regulations adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall determine Europol's structure, operation, field of action and tasks. These tasks may include: a) the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of information, in particular that forwarded by the authorities of the Member States or third countries or bodies;
b) the coordination, organisation and implementation of investigative and operational action carried out jointly with the Member States' competent authorities or in the context of joint investigative teams, where appropriate in liaison with Eurojust.
These regulations shall also lay down the procedures for scrutiny of Europol's activities by the European Parliament, together with national Parliaments. As has already been noted, one of the products of the ESS has been the development of a more coordinated approach to the problem of organised crime in the EU. In addition to providing a basis for the development of the European Criminal
Intelligence Model (ECIM), the ESS has also led to a greater leadership role for
Europol in detection and prevention of organised crime and to increased recognition for the work done by Eurojust. In the following sections, the work of Europol and
Eurojust will be examined, with particular attention on the development of the ECIM and more recently the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA). 
Europol and Eurojust

The European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM)
The European 
Drawing heavily on the ideas of intelligence-led policing (as developed in the United
Kingdom and the United States), the ECIM stresses the importance of producing joint assessments of serious and organised crime, based on shared intelligence and direct input from national police forces within the EU. 22 According to the ECIM, threat assessment should be constructed according to the following four steps:
(1) Police forces of Member States share information and intelligence with Europol.
(2) Europol drafts an assessment of the overall level of threat facing the EU. The success of the ECIM is reflected in the influence that it has had on the 2009 Europol Work Programme. 25 Although no specific reference is made to the ECIM in the document, the Programme repeatedly refers to decisions taken by the JHA Council in October 2005 and to the importance of intelligence-led policing. It is also important to note that the ECIM has provided the basis for another key initiative, namely the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA), which is discussed below.
The Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA)
Prior to At a practical level, the OCTA aims to ensure that police operations conducted by Member States are driven by strategically relevant intelligence and that the appropriate law enforcement instruments are used. 27 For the most part, the OCTA appears to be succeeding in this aim, although some commentators have questioned whether the information being provided via the Assessments is having the desired effect on operational practices. According to Dr Nicholas Ridley of the John Grieve Centre in London, while the OCTA is "a magnificent tour de force from an academic, strategic analysis point of view … the unfortunate thing is that OCTA is not really operationally oriented." 28 This is problem that has been at least partly acknowledged by Europol itself, with the introduction to the 2008 OCTA noting that "the OTCA itself is not detailed enough to pinpoint specific criminal investigations."
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The development of the OTCA also appears to have been hampered by the fact that some Member States seem unwilling to provide the required information and intelligence to Europol. As Bradley has noted, while in 2006 one Member State submitted over 500 pages of criminal intelligence to the first OCTA, another contributed only "a single page". 30 In addition, because the OTCA does not include any assessment of terrorist threats, it can be argued that it is only of limited use to Member States as regards the development of comprehensive law enforcement and security strategies.
Centralising Control or Creating Channels?
One of the key questions that needs to be asked about the current EU approach to organised crime is whether it is designed to encourage greater centralisation or instead to lead to the dispersal of investigative and preventative functions. Put another way, there appears to be a developing tension between the desire to give Europol (and Eurojust) a more prominent role in the development and coordination of EU-wide responses to serious and organised crime on the one hand, and the stated aim of enabling Member States and national agencies to produce better informed local strategies on the other hand. This is a tension that is exacerbated by the fact that Based on the overview provided in this briefing paper, it is possible to identify a number of key areas of concern regarding the current approach taken by the EU to matters of security, organised crime, and counter-terrorism. The following conclusions and recommendations are intended to provide guidance to the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on how to address these concerns and to suggest possible areas for future research and action.
Before moving to the specific recommendations, is it important to draw attention to the lack of available evidence on the operational practices and effectiveness of the various institutions discussed in this briefing paper. Despite the fact that Europol produces an annual report and publishes the yearly OCTA, there is very little detailed information available in the public domain about its workings or its relationship with specific Member States or national law enforcement agencies. Although it is not surprising, given the sensitive nature of the work undertaken by Europol, this lack of transparency needs to be addressed if Europol (and Eurojust) are to play an enhanced role in the provision of security and policing services across the EU. Public as well as institutional confidence in such institutions is vital for their long-term success, and they should therefore endeavour to provide as much information-in easily understandable and accessible forms-to the public as possible. In addition, it is clear that there has been very little in the way of independent research into the operation of the ECIM and the development of the OTCA. Given their central importance to the overall EU security and policing strategy, this is regrettable-and a deficiency that LIBE and other relevant EU bodies should consider rectifying in the future (either by encouraging and sponsoring such research or by facilitating access to relevant institutions by independent researchers and research organisations).
Recommendation One: The Need for Simplicity and Transparency
As even this short briefing paper demonstrates, the current EU structure for the investigation and prevention of organised crime and terrorism is extremely complex.
Aside from the fact that this complexity may make it more difficult for individuals and agencies within Member States to access the full range of law-enforcement and intelligence services provided by the EU, this complex arrangement also increases the likelihood that information will not be effectively or efficiently shared between various EU institutions or between the EU and Member States. As such, there is a pressing need for a comprehensive review of the existing structures, with a view to rationalising the relationships between the various institutions responsible for security, serious crime and terrorism and making the operation of these institutions more transparent.
Recommendation Two: A Committee on Internal Security
Building on Recommendation One, the European Parliament should welcome the possibility -foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty -of establishing a "Committee on Internal
Security", which would have overarching responsibility for developing policy and coordinating EU efforts in relation to security, serious crime, and terrorism. sharing and the exchange of intelligence is at the heart of the ECIM and OCTA, careful thought must be given to how best to implement these provisions, with a view to ensuring that they enhance rather than impede cooperation. To this end, the European Parliament should whenever possible encourage independent research into the likely effects of the Prüm Decision on data sharing within the EU and address the specific concerns raised by the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator concerning the future governance of EU information exchange. 37 Furthermore, consideration should also be 34 It should be noted that the establishment of such a body may go some way towards meeting the concerns of Member States such as Austria, which has called for greater operational coordination within the EU and the establishment of an "internal security architecture". given to the possible role that could be played by the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) in the development of any data sharing regulations or governance arrangements. The development of the EU's security and policing structures is still in its early stages, and by providing this support the European Parliament will be making a substantial contribution to the creation of a more effective and efficient approach to the problems of organised crime and terrorism.
